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Abstract—The Internet of things (IoT) is revolutionizing the
management and control of automated systems leading to a
paradigm shift in areas such as smart homes, smart cities, health
care, transportation, etc. The IoT technology is also envisioned
to play an important role in improving the effectiveness of
military operations in battlefields. The interconnection of com-
bat equipment and other battlefield resources for coordinated
automated decisions is referred to as the Internet of battlefield
things (IoBT). IoBT networks are significantly different from
traditional IoT networks due to battlefield specific challenges such
as the absence of communication infrastructure, heterogeneity of
devices, and susceptibility to cyber-physical attacks. The combat
efficiency and coordinated decision-making in war scenarios
depends highly on real-time data collection, which in turn relies
on the connectivity of the network and information dissemination
in the presence of adversaries. This work aims to build the theo-
retical foundations of designing secure and reconfigurable IoBT
networks. Leveraging the theories of stochastic geometry and
mathematical epidemiology, we develop an integrated framework
to quantify the information dissemination among heterogeneous
network devices. Consequently, a tractable optimization problem
is formulated that can assist commanders in cost effectively
planning the network and reconfiguring it according to the
changing mission requirements.
Index Terms—Battlefield, epidemics, internet of things, multi-
plex networks, Poisson point process, random geometric graph.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of things (IoT) is an emerging paradigm that
allows the interconnection of devices which are equipped
with electronic sensors and actuators [2]. It allows for a
higher level of situational awareness and effective automated
decisions without human intervention. The concept has proven
to be extremely useful in applications such as smart homes,
energy management, smart cities, transportation, health care,
and other domains [3]. Recently, there is an interest in the
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Fig. 1: A typical IoBT network with heterogeneous battlefield
things and random enemy attacks. Battlefield devices interact
with other devices within their communication range in a D2D
manner for exchange of mission critical information. The link
shape illustrates the piece of information being shared.
defence community to leverage the benefits enabled by the IoT
to improve the combat efficiency in battlefields and effectively
manage war resources [4], [5]. This emerging area of using IoT
technology for defence applications is being referred to as the
Internet of battlefield things (IoBT) [6], [7]. Fig. 1 illustrates
a typical battlefield comprising of heterogeneous objects, such
as soldiers, armoured vehicles, and aircrafts, that communicate
with each other amidst cyber-physical attacks from the enemy.
The IoBT has the potential to completely revolutionize
modern warfare by using data to improve combat efficiency as
well as reduce damages and losses by automated actions while
reducing the burden on human war-fighters. Currently, the
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems use millions
of sensors deployed on a range of platforms to provide
situational awareness to military commanders and troops, on
the ground, seas, and in the air [8]. However, the real power
lies in the interconnection of devices and sharing of sensory
information that will enable humans to make useful sense of
the massive, complex, confusing, and potentially deceptive
ocean of information [9]. In the battlefield scenarios, the
communications between strategic war assets such as aircrafts,
warships, armoured vehicles, ground stations, and soldiers
can lead to improved coordination, which can be enabled
by the IoBT [10]. However, to become a reality, this vision
will have to overcome several technical limitations of current
information systems and networks.
Most civilian IoT applications such as smart homes and
cities are infrastructure based, where the devices are connected
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to each other and the internet via an access point or gateway.
In the battlefield scenario, the communication infrastructure
such as cellular networks or base stations may not be avail-
able. Hence, the battlefield things need to exploit device-
to-device (D2D) communications [11] to share information
with other things1. Therefore, the information sharing can be
affected by the physical parameters of the network such as
the transmission power of the things, the number of deployed
things, their locations, and the flexibility of communication
with other types of things. In addition to these factors, another
impediment in the connectivity of battlefield things is the sus-
ceptibility to cyber-physical attacks. The information exchange
between things may be affected by several factors such as
jamming of radio frequency (RF) channels, physical attacks on
infrastructure, node failures due to attacks on power sources, or
lack of power, etc. Since the analytics and automated decisions
in an IoBT network rely on the real-time data provided by
the sensors deployed in the battlefield, we need to ensure the
spread of information in the networks with a certain level of
reliability and security to make accurate decisions.
Although the IoBT has to do to with much more beyond the
connectivity of battlefield things, such as digital analytics and
automated response, which allows the systems to react more
quickly and precisely than humans; however, the connectivity
aspect is vital in allowing the IoBT systems to unleash their
full potential. It is ideal if we can achieve complete situational
awareness and perfect information spreading throughout the
network. However, due to limited available resources, incurred
costs (capital and operational), and vulnerability to attacks, it
is not practical and hence requires a cost-effective, secure and
reconfigurable network design. Therefore, in this paper, we
first characterize the information dissemination in an IoBT
network under vulnerabilities, and use it to design the network
parameters to reliably achieve mission specific performance
goals with minimal amount of resources. We then present
a reconfigurable framework that adapts with the changing
connectivity situation of the network.
A. Related Work
Stochastic geometry (SG) based models have been success-
fully used in the modeling and analysis of traditional wireless
networks such as cellular networks [12] and ad-hoc wireless
sensor networks [13]. These models accurately capture the
effect of spatial distribution of network devices on their con-
nectivity and performance. However, they lack the capability
of analysing the dynamics of information dissemination in
communication networks. One area of research related to this
work is the study of probabilistic message broadcasting and
percolation in random graphs [13], [14]. Research in this direc-
tion has focused on identifying the conditions for the existence
of giant connected components, and the analysis of connec-
tivity. On the other hand, mathematical epidemiology [15] has
been studied extensively for analyzing the spread of viruses
in computers, rumours in humans, and infectious diseases in
biological networks [16]–[18]. Although the epidemic models
1We use the terms “things” and “devices” interchangeably to refer to
battlefield things throughout the paper.
are useful in capturing the diffusion of pathogens or rumors
in a population, they do not take the geometry of the network
into account and hence, cannot give meaningful insights in
physically deployed communication networks. This research
aims to investigate the dynamic decision-making and control
of information dissemination and the design of multi-layer
communication networks.
Some attempts have been made to study the dynamical
information dissemination in wireless networks such as [19],
[20]. However, they focus on traditional wireless adhoc net-
works, which do not capture the unique characteristics of IoBT
networks. Moreover, there are few descriptive models available
in literature for designing IoT networks, most of which are
developed for civilian applications [21], and are not applicable
to IoT networks over battlefields. Since IoBT networks are
envisioned to exploit D2D communications and devices may
be equipped with multiple radios for tactical communications,
the information dissemination is directly associated with the
communication characteristics of network devices as well as
their associated deployment densities. Hence, it is imperative
to develop an integrated design framework that can capture
the specific features of IoBT networks.
IoBT networks are composed of heterogeneous devices
which may connect to more than one communication network
based on the hardware capabilities. This requires a multi-layer
network model that is able to incorporate the connectivity
of such devices. In epidemiology literature, the multi-layer
networks have been studied in the context of communication-
contact layer networks [22]. These are networks in which
there is physical contact between the agents in one layer
that allows for disease spreading and communication contact
on the other layer, e.g., via telephone or social network,
that allows for awareness spreading. The diffusion in such
multiplex networks [23] is asymmetric and the interplay be-
tween the networks has been studied in [24]. The dynamical
process of multiple diseases spreading in multiplex networks
is provided in [25]. However, our focus is on symmetric multi-
layer communication networks that have different types of
information propagating simultaneously in different network
layers. Moreover, the physical connectivity in each layer has
a certain structure based on the communication characteristics
of the devices as opposed to complex networks that have non-
trivial topological features. In this paper, we develop a spe-
cialized framework for information dissemination over IoBT
networks that utilizes the connectivity structure in the multi-
layer heterogeneous network by making use of the existing
works in epidemiology. Some initial results of the developed
framework have been presented in [1]. However, the results
are based on the assumption of reciprocity of communication
between devices of one layer that are under the influence of
the devices of other network layers. In this work, we lift this
assumption and present a practical network model consisting
of multi-radio devices that forms a multiplex communication
network. We believe that such network models are well-suited
to battlefield communications.
B. Contributions
In this paper, we develop a SG based model to characterize
the connectivity of IoBT networks in terms of the degree
distribution of the devices. We then use an epidemic spreading
model to capture the dynamic diffusion of multiple messages
within the network of devices at the equilibrium state. The
resulting integrated open-loop system model is used as a basis
for reconfiguring the network parameters to ensure a mission-
driven information spreading profile in the network. This paper
attempts to bridge the gap between the spatial stochastic mod-
els for wireless networks and the dynamic diffusion models
in contact-based biological networks to derive new insights
that aid in the planning and design of secure and reliable
IoBT networks for mission critical information dissemination.
The developed framework, with some modifications, is also
applicable to the more general class of heterogeneous ad-hoc
networks. The main contributions of this paper are summarized
as follows:
• A novel multiplex network model for IoBT networks is
proposed that helps in characterizing the intra-layer and
network-wide connectivity of heterogeneous battlefield
devices by considering the spatial randomness in their
locations.
• A tractable framework is developed for quantification of
simultaneous information dissemination in the multiplex
IoBT network based on mathematical epidemiology that
considers the perceived level of threat to the network from
cyber-physical attacks. Approximate closed form results
relating the proportion of informed devices at equilibrium
and the network parameters are provided.
• An optimization problem is formulated that can assist
military commanders in identifying the physical network
parameters that are required in order to sufficiently secure
the network from the perceived attacks. It can also help
in reconfiguring existing networks to achieve a desired
level of communication reliability.
• A detailed investigation of the developed integrated
framework is provided for particular battlefield missions
and the effect of threat level and performance thresholds
is studied.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we first describe the geometry of the IoBT
network and propose a bi-layer abstraction model using tools
from stochastic geometry. Then, we develop a dynamic model
to characterize information dissemination in the heterogeneous
IoBT network based on mathematical epidemiology.
A. Network Geometry
We consider uniformly deployed heterogeneous battlefield
things in R2 that can be abstracted as a Poisson Point Process
(PPP)2 [26] with intensity λ devices/km2, referred to as
2While the devices can be placed more strategically according to their
characteristics and utility, however, due to potential mobility and difficulty
of tracking network topology, these optimal locations may not be known or
fixed, which justifies the PPP assumption.
Φ = {Xi, Ti}i≥1, where Xi and Ti represents the location and
type of the ith device respectively. We assume that the network
is composed of two types of devices, i.e., Ti ∈ {1, 2},∀i ≥ 1.
The first type of devices, i.e., Ti = 1, referred to as type-I
devices, are equipped with two radio interfaces. The second
type of devices, i.e., Ti = 2, referred to as type-II devices, have
only one radio interface that is compatible with type-I devices.
In the first network layer, only type-I devices can communicate
with other type-I devices, while in the second layer, both type-
I and type-II devices can communicate with each other due to
the availability of common radios. Assuming that each device
can be of type-I with probability p, i.e., P(Ti = 1) = p, ∀i ≥ 1,
then the set of active devices in the first network layer can
be represented by a PPP Φ1 = {Xi ∈ Φ : Ti = 1} with
intensity λ1 = pλ, that is obtained by an independent thinning
of the original point process Φ. On the other hand, since all
the devices in the second network layer can communicate with
each other, so the active devices can be represented by a PPP
Φ2 = Φ, with intensity λ2 = λ. Note that the devices can
move independently and we assume that the placement of
devices as a result of mobility remains uncorrelated, i.e., can
be represented by a new realization of the original PPP, thus
resulting in a quasi-static network.
This type of network configuration is particularly well-
suited to IoBT networks, where type-I devices may correspond
to ground stations or armored vehicles equipped with multiple
types of radios, while type-II devices may correspond to
soldiers equipped with single radio smart mobile devices.
The equipped radios on the devices are characterized by their
transmission power or equivalently, the communication range
rm in meters, m ∈ {1, 2}. Type-I devices have two radios
with transmission ranges r1 and r2, respectively, while type-
II devices have one radio with transmission range r2. The
communication range of the radios is tunable in the interval
[rminm ,r
max
m ], where r
min
m ≥ 0 and rmaxm ≥ rminm ,∀m ∈ {1, 2}
and we assume that r2 ≤ r1.
Due to the absence of traditional communication infras-
tructure such as base stations, the devices are only able
to communicate using D2D communications, i.e., devices
x, y ∈ Φm are connected to each other in network layer
m if ‖x − y‖ ≤ rm, m ∈ {1, 2}, where ‖.‖ represents the
Euclidean distance. Similarly, devices x ∈ Φ1 and y ∈ Φ\Φ1
can communicate with each other only if ‖x−y‖ ≤ r2. Hence,
the communication links between devices in each layer can be
modeled using a random geometric graph (RGG) [27] with a
connection radius of rm,m ∈ {1, 2}. Each of the layers of the
multiplex network has a different connectivity that depends on
the respective device densities and the communication ranges.
An illustrative representation of the network model is provided
in Fig. 2 that shows the connectivity between type-I devices
in the first layer and the connectivity between all devices in
the second layer. In the subsequent subsection, we analyze the
connectivity of the devices in each layer, referred to as intra-
layer connectivity and the connectivity of the overall network,
referred to as network-wide connectivity.
m = 1
m = 2
r1
r2
Type 1 device
Type 2 device
Fig. 2: Heterogeneous IoBT network decomposed into virtual
connectivity layers. The blue region illustrates the commu-
nication reach of type-I devices in layer 1 while the red
region illustrates the communication reach of type-I and type-
II devices in layer 2.
B. Network Connectivity
In this subsection, we describe the connectivity between the
heterogeneous devices in an IoBT network. The connectivity
of devices can be classified into intra-layer and network-wide
connectivity, which are explained as follows:
1) Intra-layer Connectivity: Within a particular network
layer m, the active3 devices can communicate with each other
if they are within a distance of rm of each other. Referring to
Fig. 1, the dotted lines between battlefield vehicles represent
the connectivity of the devices in the first layer. Similarly,
the solid lines between soldiers and vehicles represent the
connectivity of the devices in the second layer. The set of
communication neighbours of a typical device x ∈ Φm in layer
m, can be expressed as Nm(x) = {y ∈ Φm : ‖x− y‖ ≤ rm}.
The connectivity of the RGG formed by devices in layer m is
characterized by the degree of the devices, denoted by Km,
which is defined as the number of neighbours of each device,
i.e., Km = |Nm(x)|, where |.| represents the set cardinality.
Since the network is spatially distributed as a PPP, the degree
of each device in the RGG is a Poisson random variable [13].
Therefore, the resulting intra-layer degree distribution of a
typical device can be expressed by the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The intra-layer degree of a typical device in each
network layer is distributed as follows:
P(K1 = k) =
{
(1− p) + pe−λ1pir21 , if k = 0,
pe−λ1pir
2
1
(λ1pir
2
1)
k
k! , if k > 0,
(1)
P(K2 = l) = e−λ2pir
2
2
(λ2pir
2
2)
l
l!
, l ≥ 0, (2)
for sufficiently large λ1, λ2, r1 and r2. The average degree of
a typical device in the two network layers can be expressed
as follows:
E[K1] = pλ1pir21, (3)
E[K2] = λ2pir22. (4)
Proof. See Appendix A.
From Fig. 2, it is clear that the average degree, or equiva-
lently the connectivity of devices in each layer depends on the
density of the deployed devices as well as the communication
range. The joint probability distribution of the connectivity of a
typical device in each layer is denoted by P(K1 = k,K2 = l).
3Type-I devices are active in both network layers while type-II devices are
only active in the second network layer.
2) Network-wide Connectivity: If the two network layers
are collapsed together to form a single virtual network such
that both layers reinforce the connectivity of the devices, then
the connectivity is characterized in terms of the combined
degree denoted by Kc. The combined-layer degree of a typical
device x ∈ Φ is defined as Kc = |N1(x)|+ |N2(x)|. Since the
degree of the devices in each layer is Poisson distributed, the
combined-layer degree follows a Poisson mixture distribution
expressed by the following lemma.
Lemma 2. The average combined-layer degree of a typical
device can be expressed as follows:
E[Kc] = pλ1pir21 + λ2pir22. (5)
Proof. See Appendix B
In the following section, we describe the information dis-
semination over such bi-layer networks that have the above
mentioned connectivity profile.
III. INFORMATION DISSEMINATION
Each type of device in the IoBT network generates data
that needs to be propagated to other devices of the same
type and/or different types of devices depending on the role
of that device. There are certain pieces of information that
needs to be shared among the same type of devices, e.g.,
soldiers need to communicate information with other soldiers
and similarly commanding units might also share information
amongst them. Henceforth, we refer to the information sharing
in each network layer as intra-layer information dissemination.
On the other hand, some information might be important for
all network nodes such as network health monitoring data
or network discovery beacons. This is henceforth referred
to as network-wide information dissemination. We assume
a time slotted system where the duration of each slot is
τ s. During each time slot, the informed devices broadcast
information to their neighbors at a rate of γ. Let P(i)s ∈ [0, 1]
be the average probability that the transmitted information
type i ∈ {1, 2, c} by a typical device is successfully received
by its neighbors, referred to as the success probability, and
δ ∈ [0, 1] be the probability that the communication will
be affected by cyber-physical attacks. Since the the event of
successful transmission due to interference from other devices
and the event of a cyber-physical attack are independent,
therefore the effective probability of a successful transmission
can be expressed as (1−δ)P(i)s . Consequently, the information
spreading rate between devices, denoted by α(i), i ∈ {1, 2, c},
can be expressed as follows:
α(i) = γ(1− δ)P(i)s , (6)
We refer to δ as the threat level as it signifies the perceived risk
in information transmission between devices. Without loss of
generality4, we can select the contact rate γ = 1, so effectively,
α(i) is the probability of successful information transmission
between devices. In essence, α(i) can be interpreted as the
desired security level from the perceived threats to the commu-
nication network. The probability of successful transmission
can be computed by setting a threshold on the received signal-
to-interference-plus-noise-ratio (SINR) at a typical device.
4There is no loss of generality since τ can be made arbitrarily small.
Several techniques can be used from SG literature to accurately
characterize the SINR based success probability depending on
the medium access protocol used [28]. We use a generalized
representation of the success probability P(i)s = gi(p, λ, r)
in terms of the densities and communication ranges of the
devices, where the function gi(.) is assumed to be monotone
in its arguments. The parameter δ can capture a broad range
of cyber-physical threats in IoBT networks. Different methods
can be used to assess the threat level in battlefields due
to jamming, physical attacks, and other adversarial actions
based on historical data and/or statistical models of attack
types, some of which are explored in existing works such
as [29] and [30]. For instance, to model jamming attacks, the
parameter δ can be based on the SINR, in which case the
RGG becomes an interference graph [31]. To tackle physical
network attacks such as targeted attacks, the parameter δ can
be based on the density of device deployment, the connectivity
of devices, or the type of devices. Furthermore, an integrated
metric can also be developed that can simultaneously capture
a multitude of threats. However, developing such a compre-
hensive metric is beyond the scope of the current work and we
use a generic threat level for illustrative purposes. Over time,
the adversarial attacks may compromise or negatively impact
significant portion of the network connectivity. So there is a
need for a resilient framework that can be reconfigured to
recover from the lost connectivity by cyber-physical attacks.
Another important aspect of the information dissemination
process is to account for the information annihilation at each
time step. There are several reasons that a device may not
broadcast the information that it has received from another
device in the previous time slot such as limited buffer capacity
and misclassifying information as unimportant. However, the
most important factor is to ensure propagating the most
recent information in the network. This dynamical information
spreading process in an IoBT network can be formalized using
the susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) model [32], which is
well studied in mathematical epidemiology. The challenge is
that information propagates over a topology in wireless com-
munication networks, while the classical SIS model does not
deal with topological constraints. Furthermore, we deal with
simultaneous information dissemination in multiple network
layers which presents additional challenges. In the following
subsection, we describe the dynamics of the information
dissemination process.
A. Information Dynamics
In this section, we present the dynamics of information
dissemination across the IoBT network. For ease of explana-
tion, we first describe the dynamics of a single message being
propagated in the network, followed by the dynamics of two
messages simultaneously spreading in the network.
1) Single Message Propagation: If all the devices in the
network disseminate the same message from one device to
another in a broadcast manner during each time slot using all
the available radio interfaces, then each device with degree
k can either be in an uninformed state (Uk) or an informed
state (Ik) depending on the success of information transmis-
sion. To model this behaviour and explain the dynamics of
information dissemination across the IoBT network, we exploit
the susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) model [32] from
mathematical epidemiology. The information dissemination is
directly related to the degree of the devices in the network,
which in turn depends on the physical network parameters.
Since the network is random with potentially a large number
of devices, we use the degree based mean-field approach, in
which all devices are considered to be statistically equivalent
in terms of the degree and the analysis is done on a typical
device. Therefore, the information dissemination dynamics of
the system can be written in terms of the degree of the devices
as follows [33]:
dI
(c)
k (t)
dt
= −µI(c)k (t) + α(c)kU (c)k (t)Θ(c), (7)
where I(c)k (t) denotes the proportion of devices with degree k
that are in state Ik, i.e., informed with network-wide informa-
tion, at time t, U (c)k (t) = 1− I(c)k (t) denotes the proportion of
degree k devices that are in state Uk. The superscript (c) refers
to the combined-layer network signifying network-wide infor-
mation dissemination. The first term in (7) explains the an-
nihilation of information with time, i.e., the informed devices
return to the uninformed sate at a rate of µ. This ensures that at
each time step, only the most recent information is propagated
in the network as a particular piece of information is discarded
after being retransmitted multiple times depending to the
annihilation rate. For equilibrium analysis, we can assume that
µ = 1 as the effect of the annihilation can be captured by
the effective spreading rate. The second term accounts for the
creation of informed devices due to the spreading. The rate of
increase in the density of informed devices with degree k is di-
rectly proportional to the degree, the probability of successful
transmission of information α, the proportion of uninformed
devices with degree k, i.e., U (c)k (t), and the average probability
that a neighbour of a device with degree k is informed,
denoted by Θ(c). The probability Θ(c) can be computed as∑
k′ P(K
neighbour
c = k′|Kc = k)I(c)k′ (t), where P(k′|Kc = k)
denotes the probability that a neighbour of a typical device
with Kc = k has a degree K
neighbour
c = k′. Since the network
is PPP, the degrees are uncorrelated, i.e., E[Kneighbourc Kc] =
E[Kneighbourc ]E[Kc], so we can effectively write P(Kneighbourc =
k′|Kc = k)I(c)k′ (t) = k
′P(Kneighbourc =k′)
E[Kc] I
(c)
k′ (t). Hence, by appro-
priately renaming dummy variables, Θ(c) can be expressed as
follows [32]:
Θ(c) =
∑
k≥0
kP(Kc = k)
E[Kc]
I
(c)
k (t), (8)
where E[Kc] is provided in Section II-B. Note that another
expression for the rate of change in the uninformed devices,
i.e.,dU
(c)
k (t)
dt , can also be written; however, it is useless since
U
(c)
k (t) depends directly on I
(c)
k (t) and thus (7) completely
describes the dynamics of network-wide information dissem-
ination.
2) Multiple Message Propagation: In general, there may
be multiple messages or pieces of information spreading in
the IoBT network at any particular time. However, for the bi-
layer network model, we assume that there are two messages
UUk,l
IIk,l
IUk,lUIk,l
UIk,l IUk,l
k σ UUk,l1l σ UUk,l2
k σ UIk,l1 l σ IU k,l2
IIk,l IIk,l
Fig. 3: State transition diagram for the simultaneous diffusion
of two different messages in the IoBT network. At each time
instant, a change in status of only one of the messages is al-
lowed. The arrows are labeled with the transition probabilities.
propagating in the network, i.e., one in each network layer.
Therefore, each device with a degree k in the first layer and
l in the second layer can be in one of the four possible
dynamical states, i.e., uninformed of both messages (UUk,l),
informed of message 1 but uninformed of message 2 (IUk,l),
uninformed of message 1 but informed of message 2 (UIk,l),
and informed of both messages (IIk,l). These state variables
denote the proportion of devices in the network that are in
that particular state. To model the coupled dynamics of this
information diffusion process, we can make use of the SIS-
SIS interaction model [25] from mathematical epidemiology.
A state transition diagram is given by Fig. 3. Notice that a
change in status of one of the messages is allowed at each
time instant. The set of differential equations describing the
state evolution are given by (9) - (12), where Θ1 and Θ2 are
the effective probabilities of a completely uninformed device,
i.e., in state UUk,l, to get informed by message 1 and message
2 respectively. They can be evaluated as follows:
Θ1 =
1
E[K1]
∑
k,l
P(K1 = k,K2 = l)k (IUk,l,σ1,σ2(t) +
IIk,l,σ1,σ2(t)) , (13)
Θ2 =
1
E[K2]
∑
k,l
P(K1 = k,K2 = l)l (UIk,l,σ1,σ2(t) +
IIk,l,σ1,σ2(t)) , (14)
Since UUk,l(t) + UIk,l(t) + IUk,l(t) + IIk,l(t) = 1, so
in essence, only three of the four differential equations are
linearly independent. The particular quantity of interest is
IIk,l(t) as it signifies the proportion of devices that are
informed by both messages simultaneously at any particular
time. This may be crucial in the IoBT setting where the devices
require information of both layers to make accurate decisions.
Note that the developed dynamics can be easily extended to
the case of multiple message propagation, which will require a
larger state space; however, in this paper, we restrict ourselves
to the case of only two network layers and messages.
B. Steady State Analysis
We are interested in determining the steady state or equi-
librium of the information dissemination process since it
characterizes the eventual spread of information in the network
which is independent of time. Although, with the changes
in network topology and other network configurations, the
actual information spread might be different; however, the
equilibrium state provides us with a reasonable understanding
of the system behavior. For the single message dissemination
case, we impose the stationarity condition, i.e., set dI
(c)
k (t)
dt = 0.
It results in the following expression:
I
(c)∗
k =
α(c)kΘ(c)(α(c))
1 + α(c)kΘ(c)(α(c))
. (15)
Notice that Θ(c)(α(c)) is now a constant that depends on α(c).
Now, (8) and (15) present a system of equations that needs to
be solved self-consistently to obtain the solution for Θ(c)(α(c))
and I(c)∗k . For the multiple message propagation case, we can
first write the reduced system in terms of the three independent
states by substituting UUk,l(t) = 1 − IUk,l(t) − UIk,l(t) −
IIk,l(t) to obtain (16), (17), and (18).
Again, using the stationarity condition, i.e., dIUk,l(t)dt = 0,
dUIk,l(t)
dt = 0, and
dIIk,l(t)
dt = 0, we obtain the following
expressions:
IU∗k,l =
α(1)kΘ1
(1 + α(1)kΘ1)(1 + α(2)lΘ2)
, (19)
UI∗k,l =
α(2)lΘ2
(1 + α(1)kΘ1)(1 + α(2)lΘ2)
, (20)
II∗k,l =
(
α(1)kΘ1
1 + α(1)kΘ1
)(
α(2)lΘ2
1 + α(2)lΘ2
)
, (21)
Now, the equations eqs. (19) to (21) and eqs. (13) and (14)
need to be solved self-consistently to obtain the equilibrium
solution of the quantity of interest, i.e., II∗k,l. In the subsequent
section, we present the methodology to obtain the solution
to the dynamical information spreading process for the IoBT
network and develop a framework that can assist in the
planning and efficient design of such networks.
IV. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we first present a solution to the dynamical
information spreading system developed in Section III and
then use it for the efficient design of IoBT networks for
mission-specific battlefield applications.
A. Equilibrium Solution
In order to find the equilibrium solution for the single
network-wide message propagation case, we need to solve the
self-consistent system expressed in (8) and (15). In fact, it
reduces to obtaining a solution to the following fixed-point
system:
Θ(c)(α(c)) =
1
E[Kc]
∑
k≥0
kP(Kc = k)
α(c)kΘ(c)(α(c))
1 + α(c)kΘ(c)(α(c))
.
(22)
An obvious solution for this fixed-point system is Θ(c)(α(c)) =
0; however, it is noninformative. The existence of a nonzero
solution is stated in the following theorem:
Theorem 1. The fixed point equation in (22) relating to the
information dissemination dynamics may have at least one
dUUk,l(t)
dt
= −(α(1)kΘ1 + α(2)lΘ2)UUk,l(t) + IUk,l(t) + UIk,l(t), (9)
dIUk,l(t)
dt
= α(1)kΘ1UUk,l(t)− (α(2)lΘ2 + 1)IUk,l(t) + IIk,l(t), (10)
dUIk,l(t)
dt
= α(2)lΘ2UUk,l(t)− (α(1)kΘ1 + 1)UIk,l(t) + IIk,l(t), (11)
dIIk,l(t)
dt
= α(1)kΘ1UIk,l(t) + α
(2)lΘ2IUk,l(t)− 2IIk,l(t), (12)
dIUk,l(t)
dt
= α(1)kΘ1 − (α(1)kΘ1 + α(2)lΘ2 + 1)IUk,l(t)− α(1)kΘ1UIk,l(t)− (α(1)kΘ1 − 1)IIk,l(t), (16)
dUIk,l(t)
dt
= α(2)lΘ2 − α(2)lΘ2IUk,l(t) + (α(1)kΘ1 + α(2)lΘ2 + 1)UIk,l(t)− (α(2)lΘ2 − 1)IIk,l(t), (17)
dIIk,l(t)
dt
= α(1)kΘ1UIk,l(t) + α
(2)lΘ2IUk,l(t)− 2IIk,l(t). (18)
solution in the domain Θ(c)(α(c)) > 0 depending on the value
of α(c). The condition for this bifurcation to hold is α(c) ≥
E[Kc]
E[K2c ]
. This bifurcation point is unique in the domain 0 <
Θ(c)(α(c)) ≤ 1.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Obtaining a closed form solution for the fixed point system
in (22) for a PPP setting is not possible due to the complex
form of P(Kc = k). Hence, an approximate solution can be
obtained using the following theorem:
Theorem 2. If a nonzero solution exists for the information
spreading dynamics in (8) and (15), i.e., α(c) ≥ E[Kc]E[K2c ] , then
for E[Kc] 1, a lower bound approximation of the solution
can be expressed as follows:
Θ(c)(α(c)) ≈
(
1− 1
α(c)E[Kc]
)+
, (23)
where (x)+ represents max(0, x).
Proof. See Appendix D.
As shown in Appendix D, Theorem 2 provides a lower
bound for the exact solution and becomes a tight approxima-
tion for E[Kc]  1. Moreover, the approximation has also
resulted in an increase of the critical information spreading
threshold to α(c) ≥ 1E[Kc] to ensure that Θ(c) ≥ 0. This is
also asymptotically accurate as the original condition can be
written as α(c) ≥ E[Kc]E[K2c ] =
1
E[Kc]+
σ2
Kc
E[Kc]
, where σ2Kc is the
variance of Kc. It approaches 1E[Kc] as E[Kc] becomes large.
The relaxed condition is formally expressed by the following
corollary.
Corollary 1. The condition for obtaining an approximate
nonzero equilibrium for the information dissemination dynam-
ics is given as follows:
α(c) ≥ 1
E[Kc]
. (24)
In the IoBT network, the physical interpretation of E[Kc]
is that the average number of communication neighbours of
a device in the combined network and hence, it is reasonable
to assume that E[Kc] ≥ 1 due to the potential high density of
devices in IoBT networks. Therefore, the solution presented in
Theorem 2 is indeed a good approximation to the actual solu-
tion. The corresponding solution for the density of informed
devices can be obtained using (15).
In the case of multiple message propagation, we need to
solve the self-consistent system of equations defined by the
equations eqs. (19) to (21) and eqs. (13) and (14). It reduces
to solving the fixed-point equations given in (25) and (26).
Notice that Θ1 and Θ2 are independent of each other and
their fixed point equations are similar to (22). Hence, the
existence and uniqueness of the fixed point can be proved
under similar conditions. Using a similar approach to the
solution of the single message propagation case, a lower bound
approximate solution is provided by the following theorem:
Theorem 3. If a nonzero solution exists for the information
spreading dynamics for the case two simultaneous message
propagation, i.e., α(1) ≥ E[K1]E[K21 ] and α
(2) ≥ E[K2]E[K22 ] , then for
E[K1] 1 and E[K2] 1, a lower bound approximation of
the solution can be expressed as follows:
Θ1(α) ≈
(
1− 1
α(1)E[K1]
)+
, (27)
Θ2(α) ≈
(
1− 1
α(2)E[K2]
)+
. (28)
Proof. See Appendix E.
Similar to Corollary 1, the condition for obtaining an ap-
proximate nonzero equilibrium solution is α(i) ≥ 1/E[Ki], i ∈
{1, 2}. The corresponding solution for the proportion of
devices that are informed both messages, i.e., IIk,l can be
obtained using (21) which turns out to be the following:
II∗k,l = I
(1)∗
k × I(2)∗l . (29)
This result is interesting and useful as it can be easily gener-
alized for the case of multiple connectivity layers, i.e., types
of devices, and multiple messages propagating simultaneously.
B. Secure and Reconfigurable Network Design
Once the equilibrium point for information dissemination
has been determined, the next step is to design the IoBT net-
work to achieve mission specific goals while efficiently using
battlefield resources. In essence, the network design implies
tuning the knobs of the network, which in the case of IoBT
networks are the transmission ranges and the node deployment
densities of the different types of battlefield things. However,
changing the physical parameters may have an impact on the
Θ1 =
1
E[K1]
∑
k,l
P(K1 = k,K2 = l)k
(
α(1)kΘ1 + α
(1)2klΘ1Θ2
(1 + α(1)kΘ1)(1 + α(2)lΘ2)
)
=
1
E[K1]
∑
k
P(K1 = k)k
(
α(1)kΘ1
1 + α(1)kΘ1
)
, (25)
Θ2 =
1
E[K2]
∑
k,l
P(K1 = k,K2 = l)l
(
α(2)lΘ2 + α
(2)2klΘ1Θ2
(1 + α(1)kΘ1)(1 + α(2)lΘ2)
)
=
1
E[K2]
∑
l
P(K2 = l)l
(
α(2)lΘ2
1 + α(2)lΘ2
)
. (26)
cost and hence, the goal is to ensure a certain information
spreading profile in the network while deploying the minimum
number of devices and using the minimum transmit power. Let
r = [r1 r2]
T represent the vector of communication ranges of
each of the type-I and type-II devices in the IoBT network. The
minimum density of the devices in the network, determined
by the mission requirements, is denoted by λmin, λmin ≥ 0.
The maximum deployment density of the devices, defined by
the capacity of the available devices, is denoted by λmax,
λmax ≥ λmin. Similarly, the tunable transmission range limits
of the devices can be expressed as rmin = [rmin1 r
min
2 ]
T ,
rminm ≥ 0, ∀m ∈ {1, 2}, and rmax = [rmax1 rmax2 ]T ,
rmaxm ≥ rminm , m ∈ {1, 2}. If w = [w1 w2]T such that∑2
m=1 wm = 1 represents the weight vector corresponding
to the relative capital cost of deploying a type-I and type-II
device respectively, and c represents the unit operational power
cost signifying the importance of network power consumption,
then a cost function for the network with device densities λ
and transmission ranges r can be expressed as follows:
C(p, λ, r) = w1pλ+ w2(1− p)λ+ c(pλrη1 + λrη2), (30)
where η denotes the path-loss exponent5. The first term
represents the total deployment cost per unit area of all the
network devices while the second term represents the total
energy cost per unit area of operating all the devices with
transmission range r. The weights w can depend on several
factors such as the time required for deployment, the monetary
cost involved, or the number of devices available in stock, etc.
We can then formulate the secure and reconfigurable network
design problem as follows:
minimize
p,λ,r
C(p, λ, r) (31)
subject to I(c)∗k ≥ T (c)k ,∀k ≥ 0, (32)
II∗k,l ≥ Tk,l,∀k ≥ 0, l ≥ 0, (33)
pmin ≤ p ≤ pmax, λmin ≤ λ ≤ λmax,
rmin ≤ r ≤ rmax, (34)
where T (c)k ∈ (0, 1), k ≥ 0 are the minimum desired
proportions of degree k devices that are informed with a single
network-wide message, Tk,l ∈ (0, 1), k ≥ 0, l ≥ 0 are the
desired proportion of devices with degree K1 = k and K2 = l
that are informed with both messages simultaneously, and pmin
and pmax are the minimum and maximum fractions of devices
respectively that are of type-I. The cost function C is a convex
nondecreasing function of p, λ, and r. However, it is an infinite
dimension optimization problem due to a constraint on each
degree class of devices. To be able to solve this problem,
we need to select a desired mapping T (c)k for the combined
degree Kc = k and similarly a mapping Tk,l for devices
5The power consumption of a device with communication range rm is
proportional to rηm.
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Fig. 4: Information dissemination profiles for varying average
degree of devices (α = 0.3).
with joint intra-layer degrees K1 = k,K2 = l, ∀k, l ≥ 0.
Further investigation reveals that for a fixed α, the information
dissemination can only have restricted trajectories based on
the average device degree as shown in Fig. 4. Hence, the
threshold mappings cannot be defined arbitrarily as they might
not be achievable. To handle this problem, we can express the
constraints in (32), assuming that α(c) satisfies the condition
in Corollary 1, as follows:
E[Kc] ≥ 1
α(c) − T (c)k /
(
k(1− T (c)k )
) ,∀k ≥ 0, (35)
Now, we need to satisfy (35) for each (k, T (c)k ) pair, and from
Fig. 4, it is clear that there is no incentive to choose a threshold
profile that is different from one of the possible trajectories.
Therefore, specifying the threshold for a single value of the
degree is sufficient to characterize the entire trajectory. Since
Kc is a random variable with a distribution centered around
E[Kc], it is plausible to set a threshold on the proportion of
devices with the average device degree, i.e., using the pair
(E[Kc], T (c)E[Kc]). It results in the following single constraint
instead of the infinite set of constraints in (32):
E[Kc] ≥ 1
α(c)(1− T (c)E[Kc])
. (36)
Note that this constraint implies α(c)E[Kc] ≥ 1/(1− T (c)E[Kc]),
which satisfies the condition in Corollary 1, ∀ T (c)E[Kc] ∈ [0, 1],
thus validating our assumption. For the second set of con-
straints in (33), due to the decomposability of II∗k,l as shown
in (29) and the fact that I(i)∗k ∈ [0, 1], i ∈ {1, 2}, the
constraints can be separated as follows:
α(1)kΘ1
1 + α(1)kΘ1
≥ Tk,l, α
(2)lΘ2
1 + α(2)lΘ2
≥ Tk,l,∀k, l ≥ 0. (37)
Moreover, the thresholds can be replaced by simply Tk and Tl
instead of Tk,l as they are constants. Using a similar approach
as before, we replace the set of infinite constraints in (33) by
the following two constraints:
E[Ki] ≥ 1
α(i)(1− TE[Ki])
, i ∈ {1, 2}. (38)
For brevity, we henceforth denote T (c)E[Kc], TE[K1], and TE[K2]
as simply T (c), T (1), and T (2). Furthermore, we denote
1
α(c)(1−T (c)) ,
1
α(1)(1−T (1)) , and
1
α(2)(1−T (2)) by T (c), T (1),
and T (2) respectively corresponding to the desired minimum
success probabilities P(i)s leading to αi, i ∈ {1, 2, c}. The
original optimization problem can then be rewritten as follows:
minimize
p,λ,r
w1pλ+ w2(1− p)λ+ c(pλrη1 + λrη2), (39)
subject to p2λpir21 + λpir
2
2 ≥ T (c), (40)
p2λpir21 ≥ T (1), (41)
λpir22 ≥ T (2), (42)
pmin ≤ p ≤ pmax, λmin ≤ λ ≤ λmax,
rmin ≤ r ≤ rmax. (43)
It is important to note that the conditions for existence of
nonzero equilibrium in Corollary 1 and the ones resulting from
Theorem 3 are implicitly incorporated into the constraints and
do not need to be imposed separately. This implies that if
a feasible solution to the optimization problem exists, then
there exists a nonzero equilibrium solution to the information
dissemination dynamics. The objective and constraints are
nondecreasing smooth functions of the optimization variables.
It is clear that the objective and constraints are convex in the
feasible solution space. Therefore, the problem can be solved
using standard convex optimization techniques [34].
The secure and resilient framework for mission critical
information dissemination in IoBT networks is provided in
Algorithm 1. At the beginning of the mission, the central net-
work planner obtains the optimal physical network parameters
by solving the optimization problem in eqs. (39) to (43), and
accordingly deploys the devices with appropriate transmission
powers. The central planner then periodically analyzes the
connectivity situation of the network with a reconfigurability
interval denoted by tr. The reconfigurability interval could
range from several hours to days depending on the mission
requirements. Several techniques may be employed to estimate
the connectivity, and consequently the information dissem-
ination in the network. The effect of physical damage can
be measured by physically monitoring the network with the
aid of robotic systems such as in [35]. On the other hand,
the effect of cyber attacks may be estimated by running
discovery tests on the network to assess the reachability of
nodes. Based on these results, estimates of the information
dissemination thresholds can be obtained, i.e., Tˆ (1), Tˆ (2),
and Tˆ (c). If there is a significant drop in the estimated
threshold as compared to the desired one or there is a change
in the required security level, then the optimization needs
to be re-computed. The new optimized parameters help in
identifying the additional deployment needed for each type
of devices and/or the reconfiguration of their transmission
powers to achieve the desired information dissemination in
Algorithm 1 Secure and Reconfigurable Network Design
1: At epoch, i.e., t = 0; Initialize requirements for infor-
mation dissemination, i.e., T (1), T (2), and T (c) and the
anticipated threat level δ.
2: Obtain optimal network parameters λinit1 = p
initλinit, λinit2 =
λinit, rinit1 , and r
init
2 by solving the optimization problem
in eqs. (39) to (43) and accordingly deploy the devices
with the appropriate communication ranges.
3: repeat
4: if t = ζtr, ζ ∈ Z+ then
5: Obtain an estimate of the density of active devices
λˆ = [λˆ1, λˆ2] and use the initial communication
ranges to estimate the prevailing information dissem-
ination level Tˆ (1), Tˆ (2), and Tˆ (c).
6: Re-evaluate the desired security level in response to
the threats and accordingly update the parameter δˆ.
7: if |T (1) − Tˆ (1)| ≥  or |T (2) − Tˆ (2)| ≥  or |T (c) −
Tˆ (c)| ≥  or δˆ 6= δ, then
8: Recompute the optimization problem in eqs. (39)
to (43) to obtain the new set of optimal parameters
λnew1 ← pnewλnew, λnew2 ← λnew, rnew1 , and rnew2 .
9: Deploy additional required λnew − λˆ devices in
the network and reconfigure transmission powers
to achieve the required transmission ranges rnew.
10: end if
11: end if
12: t← t+ 1;
13: until End of mission.
the IoBT network. In the following section, we investigate the
behaviour of the optimal solutions under varying threat levels
and mission specific performance thresholds.
V. RESULTS
In this section, we provide the results obtained by testing
the developed framework under different battlefield missions.
We assume a bi-layer IoBT network comprising of type-I
and type-II devices. The first type of devices is assumed
to be commanders and the second type is assumed to be
followers. The assumption yields a simple yet natural network
configuration in a battlefield, e.g., being composed of soldiers
and distributed commanding units. The allowable physical
parameter ranges of the respective devices are selected to be
as follows: the minimum and maximum device deployment
density is selected as λmin = 1 km−2 and λmax = 15 km−2
respectively, the minimum and maximum fraction of type-I
devices pmin = 0 and pmax = 0.4 respectively, the minimum
and maximum communication ranges of devices in the first
layer, rmin1 = 100 m and r
max
1 = 2000 m respectively, and
the minimum and maximum communication ranges of devices
in the second layer, rmin2 = 10 m and r
max
2 = 800 m. The
parameters imply that the active devices in the first layer, i.e.,
the commanding units have a higher allowable transmission
range than the followers. In practice, the limits can be based
on tactical requirements of the missions. For simplicity, we
assume that sufficient number of channels are available and
for the considered densities and communication ranges of the
devices, and the MAC protocol is able to effectively mitigate
interference in the communication resulting in a constant suc-
cess probability. Further, we assume that the desired success
probabilities P(i)s = 1,∀i ∈ {1, 2, c} implying perfect success
of transmissions. Consequently, α(1) = α(2) = α(c) and is
henceforth referred to as α. The weights representing the
relative deployment cost are chosen to be w1 = 100 and
w2 = 50, which implies that the deployment cost of the
commanding units is twice as much as the follower units.
The unit cost of power is selected to be c = 100 that can
be adjusted according to the importance of each mission and
the path-loss exponent η = 4.
A. Mission Scenarios
In the battlefields, there can be several types of missions
such as intelligence, surveillance, encounter battle, espionage,
reconnaissance, etc. In our results, we will focus particularly
on the two most common mission scenarios, i.e., intelligence
and encounter battle. Both of them have completely different
requirements in terms of the information flow in the network,
which are described as follows:
1) Intelligence: In the intelligence mission, the goal is to
provide commanders with the information from a range of
sources to assist them in operational or campaign planning.
This requires a high network-wide dissemination of a single
message, while the condition for simultaneously informed
devices may not be stringent. In essence, the commander
network must reinforce the follower network to achieve a
high network-wide message propagation. Hence, to emulate
such an intelligence mission, we select the following set
of information spreading thresholds: T (1) = T (2) = 0.6,
T (c) = 0.8. The optimal physical parameters obtained for
the intelligence mission against increasing threat level δ are
shown in Fig. 5. There are several interesting observations in
the intelligence mission. A general trend is that the required
transmission ranges and deployment densities increases as the
threat level increases. Consequently, the cost function, which
signifies the deployment and operation cost of the network,
also increases as shown in Fig. 5(c). Fig. 5(a) and Fig. 5(b)
show that the transmission range of the commanders is always
higher than the followers while the densities of the followers
is higher than that of the commanders. This observation makes
sense as the followers equipped with sensors should be more
in the total number while the commander network should have
a larger influence area to be able to gather information for the
intelligence mission. Another important observation is that the
framework tends to increase the deployment density of the
devices first before increasing their transmission ranges. It is
due to a high cost of power consumption that tends to force
the devices to minimize the transmission ranges.
2) Encounter Battle: In the encounter battle or meeting
engagement scenario, there is a contact between the battling
forces. In such situations, commanders need to act quickly to
gain advantage over the opponents. This requires devices to be
informed simultaneously about the information disseminated
in both network layers. Hence, there is a need for strong
coordination among commanders as well as followers. Ad-
ditionally, the common status information sharing between all
network devices must be sufficiently high to ensure accurate
decision-making. Therefore, we set the following information
spreading thresholds: T (1) = T (2) = 0.8 and T (c) = 0.6.
The resulting optimal parameters against the changing threat
level are presented in Fig. 6. In contrast with the intelligence
mission, the framework utilizes all the available devices at
a much lower threat level and is also forced to increase the
transmission ranges to full capacity despite the high power
cost. The cost function for the encounter battle in Fig. 6(c) is
significantly higher than the intelligence mission in Fig. 5(c)
due to more stringent information spreading criteria which
requires more transmission power and higher device density.
Next, we study the impact of the information spreading
thresholds on the optimal network parameters. In Fig. 7,
we fix the intra-layer information dissemination threshold to
T (1) = T (2) = 0.5 and observe the change in parameters
for varying network-wide information dissemination threshold
T (c). Notice that the curves in Fig. 7(a) and Fig. 7(b) are
mostly flat except for very high values of T (c). This implies
that there is no need for additional resources to achieve a
higher network-wide information dissemination, which reaf-
firms the fact that the intra-layer information dissemination is
a much stricter condition than the network-wide information
dissemination. Similarly, in Fig. 8, we fix the network-wide
information dissemination threshold to T (c) = 0.5 and observe
the change in optimal parameters with a change in intra-
layer information dissemination threshold. In this case, the
device densities are increased successively followed by the
communication ranges as the threshold for the proportion of
simultaneously informed devices is increased.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a generic framework for
secure and reconfigurable design of IoT empowered battlefield
networks. The framework provides a tractable approach to tune
the physical network parameters to achieve the desired real-
time data dissemination among different types of battlefield
devices according to the assigned missions. It takes into
account the perceived threat level from the opponent as well
as the costs involved in the deployment and operation of
combat equipment to provide a robust and cost effective
design of communication networks in battlefields which can
be highly useful in military planning. Optimized network
parameters are provided for the two typical mission scenarios
of intelligence and encounter battle in which the desired in-
formation spreading objectives are different from one another.
Results show that the mission goals can be achieved by either
appropriately changing the deployment density of combat units
or by changing their transmission powers or both in response
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Fig. 7: Network parameter variation with changes in combined-layer information dissemination threshold.
to changing mission requirements. Moreover, the network can
be reconfigured according to the periodic assessment of lost
connectivity or changes in security requirements to meet the
desired mission goals.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
To evaluate the degree distribution of the devices in the first
network layer, we proceed as follows:
P(K1 = k) =
2∑
j=1
P(K1 = k|Ti = j)P(Ti = j), (44)
Since type-II devices are not active in the first network layer,
so we know that P(K1 = 0|Ti = 2) = 1 and P(K1 >
0|Ti = 2) = 0. However, type-I devices can communicate
with other type-I devices in the first network layer. Since
the active devices in the first layer are also represented as
a PPP, the degree of the RGG formed among the active
devices is Poisson distributed [13], i.e., P(K1 = k|Ti = 1) ∼
Poisson(λ1pir21). It follows that P(K1 = 0|Ti = 1) = e−λ1pir
2
1
and P(K1 > 0|Ti = 1) = e
−λ1pir21 (λ1pir21)
k
k! , k > 0. Finally,
since P(Ti = 1) = p and P(Ti = 2) = 1−p, we can substitute
the corresponding expressions for K1 = 0 and K1 > 0 in (44)
to obtain the result in (1). Similarly, for the distribution of K2,
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Fig. 8: Network parameter variation with changes in intra-layer information dissemination threshold.
we know that P(K2 = k) ∼ Poisson(λ2pir22) regardless of Ti.
This directly leads to the result in (2). Using these probability
distributions, it is straightforward to derive the expected degree
in both layers given by (3) and (4).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
The distribution of the combined degree can be evaluated as
follows:
P(Kc = k) =
2∑
j=1
P(Kc = k|Ti = j)P(Ti = j), (45)
It is clear that P(Kc = k|Ti = 2) ∼ Poisson(λ2pir22) as
type-II devices are only connected in the second network
layer. However, if a typical device is of type-I, then the
degree needs to be more carefully evaluated. We have provided
an illustration in Fig. 9 to aid in characterizing the degree.
The degree of a type-I device placed at the origin can be
expressed as Kc = 2N1A + N2A + N1B, where N1A and
N2A represent the number of devices of type-I and type-
II respectively in the green shaded circular region A. N1B
represents the number of type-I devices in the blue shaded
hollow circular region B. Note that type-I and type-II devices
are distributed according to independent PPPs with intensity
pλ and (1−p)λ. It results in the fact that N1A, N2A, and N1B
are independent random variables following a Poisson(pλpir22),
Poisson((1−p)λpir22), and Poisson(pλpi(r21−r22)) respectively.
The sum Kc is not composed of independent terms, how-
ever, due to N1A which has a multiplicity of 2. Therefore,
P(Kc = k|Ti = 1) = P(N1A = k2 ) ∗ P(N2A = k) ∗ P(N1B =
k), where ∗ represents the convolution operator. Therefore,
the probability distribution of the combined degree can be
obtained by substituting the above developed expressions
into (45) and using the fact that P(Ti = 1) = p and
P(Ti = 2) = 1 − p. The average combined layer degree can
be obtained as E(Kc) = p (2E(N1A) + E(N2A) + E(N1B))+
(1− p)(λpir22) = pλ1pir21 + λ2pir22 .
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Fig. 9: Combined degree of a typical device located at the
origin.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
To prove that the fixed point equation described by (22)
has a unique solution in the domain Θ(c) > 0, we make use
of the Banach fixed-point theorem (or contraction mapping
theorem) [36]. We prove that the functional
F (Θ(α(c))) =
1
E[Kc]
E
[
K2cα
(c)Θ(α(c))
1 +Kcα(c)Θ(α(c))
]
(46)
experiences a contraction for all Θ(α(c)) ∈ [0, 1]. More
precisely, we prove that |F (Θ1(α(c))) − F (Θ2(α(c)))| ≤
c|Θ1(α(c)) − Θ2(α(c))| for any Θ1(α(c)),Θ2(α(c)) ∈ [0, 1],
where 0 ≤ c < 1. The fact that the constant c is strictly less
than 1 implies that the functional is contracted. The proof is
as follows:∣∣∣F (Θ1(α(c)))− F (Θ2(α(c)))∣∣∣ = (47)∣∣∣∣ 1E[Kc]E
[
K2cα
(c)Θ1(α
(c))
1 +Kcα(c)Θ1(α(c))
]
−
1
E[Kc]
E
[
K2cα
(c)Θ2(α
(c))
1 +Kcα(c)Θ2(α(c))
]∣∣∣∣ ,
=
∣∣Θ1(α(c))−Θ2(α(c))∣∣
E[Kc]
×
E
[
K2cα
(c)
(1 +Kcα(c)Θ1(α(c)))(1 +Kcα(c)Θ2(α(c)))
]
. (48)
To complete the proof, we need to show that
1
E[Kc]
E
[
K2cα
(c)
(1 +Kcα(c)Θ1(α(c)))(1 +Kcα(c)Θ2(α(c)))
]
< 1,
(49)
Let g(Kc) =
K2cα
(c)
(1+Kcα(c)Θ1(α(c)))(1+Kcα(c)Θ2(α(c)))
. It can be
proved that g(Kc) is concave for Kc ≥ 0 by showing that
g′′(Kc) < 0,∀Kc ≥ 0. Therefore, using Jensen’s inequal-
ity [37], we can say that E[g(Kc)] ≤ g(E[Kc]), with equality
iff Kc is deterministic. It follows that
1
E[Kc]
E
[
K2cα
(c)
(1 +Kcα(c)Θ1(α(c)))(1 +Kcα(c)Θ2(α(c)))
]
≤
E[Kc]α(c)
(1 + E[Kc]α(c)Θ1(α(c)))(1 + E[Kc]α(c)Θ2(α(c)))
,
=
1
Θ1(α(c)) + Θ2(α(c)) + E[Kc]α(c)Θ1(α(c))Θ2(α(c)) + 1E[Kc]α(c)
.
(50)
The expression in (50) is strictly less than 1 only if the
following condition is satisfied:
Θ1(α
(c)) + Θ2(α
(c)) + E[Kc]α(c)Θ1(α(c))Θ2(α(c))+
1
E[Kc]α(c)
> 1. (51)
The condition in (51) depends on the relative magnitudes of
the quantities E[Kc] and α(c). Regardless, it reveals that we
need to exclude the values of Θ(α(c)) that are too close to
zero. For sufficiently large values of Θ(α(c)), it is clear from
(51), that F (Θ(α(c))) is indeed a contraction with respect to
the absolute value metric. Hence, by the contraction mapping
theorem, F (Θ(α(c))) has a unique fixed point in the domain
Θ(α(c)) > 0.
The nonzero equilibrium solution can be obtained by solv-
ing the following equation:
1 =
1
E[Kc]
E
[
K2cα
(c)
1 +Kcα(c)Θ(α(c))
]
. (52)
Let h(Θ(α(c))) = 1E[Kc]E
[
K2cα
(c)
1+Kcα(c)Θ(α(c))
]
. We need to find
a solution to the equation h(Θ(α(c))) = 1 in the domain
0 < Θ(α(c)) ≤ 1. It is clear that h(Θ(α(c))) is monotonically
decreasing for Θ(α(c)) > 0. Therefore, it is sufficient to show
that h(0) > 1 and h(1) < 1 for a unique nonzero solution to
exist for the equation h(Θ(α(c))) = 1. This result is proved
below:
h(0) =
1
E[Kc]
E
[
K2cα
(c)
]
= α(c)
E[K2c ]
E[Kc]
, (53)
h(1) =
1
E[Kc]
E
[
K2cα
(c)
1 +Kcα(c)
]
=
1
E[Kc]
E
[
Ki
Kcα
(c)
1 +Kcα(c)
]
<
1
E[Kc]
E[Kc] = 1. (54)
In (54), the inequality follows from the fact that Kcα
(c)
1+Kcα(c)
<
1,∀Kc > 0, α(c) > 0. A nonzero solution to (52) exists only
if h(0) ≥ 1, which implies that α(c) ≥ E[Kc]E[K2c ] . This is exactly
the critical spreading rate, also known as epidemic threshold,
in the SIS model [18].
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APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Obtaining the nonzero solution for the fixed point equation
(22) in closed form is not possible since we need to solve the
following equation for Θ(α(c)):
1 =
1
E[Kc]
∞∑
k=0
K2cα
(c)
1 +Kcα(c)Θ(α(c))
P(Kc = k), (55)
where P (Kc = k) is difficult to obtain in closed form.
Therefore, we resort to finding an approximation for the
solution which is asymptotically accurate. Let g(Kc) =
K2cα
(c)
1+Kcα(c)Θ(α(c))
. Since g′′(Kc) > 0,∀Ki ≥ 0, so g(Ki) is
a convex function for Ki ≥ 0. Using Jensen’s inequality, we
can say that E[g(Kc)] ≥ g(E[Kc]), with equality only if Kc
is deterministic. This implies the following:
E
[
K2cα
(c)
1 +Kcα(c)Θ(α(c))
]
≥ E[Kc]
2α(c)
1 + E[Kc]α(c)Θ(α(c))
. (56)
Therefore, we can write (55) as follows:
1 ≥ E[Kc]α
(c)
1 + E[Kc]α(c)Θ(α(c))
, (57)
which leads to the final solution,
Θ(α(c)) ≥ 1− 1
α(c)E[Kc]
. (58)
Using our prior knowledge that Θ(α(c)) ≥ 0, we need to
ensure that α(c)E[Kc] ≥ 1. In general, the complete solution
can be expressed as Θ(α(c)) ≥ max(0, 1 − 1
α(c)E[Kc] ). To
measure the accuracy of this bound, we solve the fixed-point
equation exactly using an fixed-point iteration and compare
the results for different values of α(c) and E[Kc] = λipir2i .
We choose a fixed ri = 0.2 km and λi = [25, 50, 100] km−2,
which results in E[Ki] = [3.14, 6.28, 12.57]. A plot of the
results is provided in Fig. 10. It can be observed that the lower
bound obtained using Jensen’s inequality is tight for all values
of α(c) when E[Ki] 1.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
The objective is to obtain a fixed point solution to the
equations (25) and (26). Since the equations are decoupled, we
can employ the same approach used for Theorem 2 to show
the existence and uniqueness of the fixed point. Consequently,
a lower bound approximation of the solution for each fixed-
point equation can be obtained using the Jensen’s inequality
as in Appendix D. The condition for existence of a solution
is α(c) ≥ E[K1]E[K21 ] and α
(c) ≥ E[K2]E[K22 ] , which can be written as
α(c) ≥ max
(
E[K1]
E[K21 ]
, E[K2]E[K22 ]
)
.
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